Most UK companies separate the roles of CEO and Chairman. The former runs the company, the latter runs the board and the two directors interact to a great extent. Using turnover data on 2180 separate chairmanships of the top 460 UK companies over the 1990-1998 period, I find that the Chairman is six times more likely to be replaced when the CEO is dismissed. Moreover, the Chairman's previous position or the type of chairmanship does not affect the association between Chairman and CEO removal. But, the Chairman is four times more likely to be penalised when he is involved in the appointment of the departing CEO. Evidence on the dismissal events suggests that Chairman replacement enables the appointment of a new CEO and other directors with different human capital, which in turn facilitates changes in future corporate decisions.
Top Director Shake-Up: The Link Between

Chairman and CEO Dismissal
In the UK the vast majority of companies separate the role of CEO from that of board Chairman. For example, Conyon and Murphy (2000) illustrate that in 1997 only 18% of British companies combine the CEO and Chairman positions. Similarly, Dahya et al. (2001) show that the fraction of joint roles in UK listed companies over the 1993-1996 period is 15.4%. Within this dual leadership structure, the CEO runs the company and the Chairman runs the board. But rather than diminishing, the power of the Chairman has increased 1 .
Specifically, the CEO does not hold all the power; certain matters (e.g. approving strategy, acquisitions and disposals, dividend and financing policy and the annual report) are reserved to the board and these are the ones where the Chairman can properly come in to play.
He can influence the directors' opinion by advising what they should say 2 . Alternatively, he can increase the effectiveness of directors, and especially non-executives, as board members by ensuring that: a) no one individual dominates the board, b) they receive timely, relevant information tailored to their needs and c) they are properly briefed on the issues arising at board meetings. Moreover, it is primarily the Chairman's job to make sure that the members of the board are well chosen and rotated when needs be, new members are properly appointed and for a needful purpose and all directors are regularly appraised. Recent surveys reveal that in the majority of UK companies the Chairman heads the nominating committee for all director appointments. (e.g. PIRC (1999) ). Finally, the Chairman has a central role in both selecting and replacing the CEO. In fact, the lower proportion of non-executives with a high profile and good rewards in the UK (compared with other countries such as the US) implies that hiring, firing and more broadly monitoring the CEO is one of the most important tasks of the Chairman.
In sum, the Chairman has not only a position that is critical to corporate success but also extensive involvement in many issues related to the CEO. The primary motivation for this study is to cast light on the consequences of CEO turnover for the Chairman's career. In other words, is the Chairman removed when the incumbent CEO departs, and in particular when he is forced out? The recent highly publicised ousting of Lord Simpson and Sir Roger
Hurn, Marconi's CEO and Chairman respectively, is a real-world illustration of the question.
A secondary objective of the study is to identify the circumstances under which the Chairman is more likely to experience adverse consequences when the CEO is ousted. Specifically, is the Chairman more likely to be punished when he is involved in the appointment of the failing CEO? In a similar vein, is the dismissal probability of the Chairman higher if he is the company's previous CEO? Finally, to the extent that an executive Chairman is considered a subordinate to the CEO, is the former more likely to face increased dismissal when the latter is removed?
A central variable employed in the study is departures from the leading executive position (hereafter referred to as the Most Senior Executive, denoted MSE). This is mainly because the title "Chief Executive Officer" has only comparatively recently been used to signal the leading corporate position in UK companies; instead other titles such as Managing
Director are also used -especially in earlier periods. Using turnover data on 2180 separate chairmanships (both executive and non-executive) of the top 460 UK companies over the 1990-1998 period, I find that the Chairman is six times more likely to be dismissed when the existing MSE is ousted. In contrast, forced Chairman departure is not related with voluntary MSE turnover. Additionally, I find that the relation between Chairman and MSE dismissal remains unchanged irrespective of the Chairman's background (i.e. previous CEO) and the type of chairmanship (i.e. executive vs. non-executive). But, the dismissal likelihood of the Chairman is four times higher when he is involved in the selection of the ousted MSE.
From a broader perspective, the study contributes to the corporate governance literature by yielding insight on the concurrent dismissal of the Chairman and CEO. From a narrower perspective, the study complements the recent work of Farrell and Whidbee (2000) and Hayes et al. (2001) . These papers show that the likelihood of outside director and non-CEO top executive (e.g. Chief Operating Officer (COO)) departure increases significantly when the CEO leaves the office. However, in both cases the interpretation of the results is limited mainly due to the lack of data on director changes (e.g. neither study records the reason for the departure). In contrast, I am able to draw inferences with more confidence by focusing on Chairman dismissal, classifying MSE departures into forced and non-forced and collecting a substantial amount of detail on the turnover events (e.g. the sequence of the two departures, the destination of the departing director etc.). Specifically, since the Chairman has a significant input in both the decision-making process of the firm and the composition of the board, a positive association between Chairman and MSE dismissal suggests that the replacement of the former enables subsequent board and corporate restructuring 3 . There is an alternative interpretation of this result, however. Given that the Chairman is primarily in charge of MSE monitoring, an association between Chairman and MSE forced departure indicates that the former is penalised for not appropriately "policing" the latter. In other words, MSE firing is symptomatic of ineffective monitoring. Detailed evidence on the dismissal of the top two directors suggests the former explanation is more credible.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section presents the research design. Section II describes the sample selection and variable definitions. Section III discusses an important specification issue relevant to interpreting the study's findings, namely the effect of firm performance. Section IV shows the empirical results whilst the robustness of the findings is considered in Section V. Section VI concludes.
I. Research Design
A. The Chairman and Most Senior Executive Positions
The empirical investigation focuses on top director turnover during the 1990-1998 period. In the UK, the title "Chief Executive Officer" has only comparatively recently been used to (Warner et al. (1988); Weisbach (1988) In general, there is a well-documented negative relation between director dismissal and firm performance (see the review by Murphy (1999) for US evidence; UK studies include Dahya et al. (2002) and Conyon and Florou (2002) Previous research identifies several additional factors that may influence the likelihood of director dismissal. The most important of these are director age and company size (Warner et al. (1988) ; Jensen and Murphy (1990) Chairmen are equally likely to leave office (turnover rate is 15% and 14% respectively) whilst the dismissal frequency is higher for the former than the latter (3.4% as opposed to 1.7%).
C. Descriptive Statistics
Panel B summarises the characteristics of MSE departures. The sample includes 221
Most Senior Executive turnover events, 102 (46%) of which are classified as forced and 117
(53%) as non-forced 10 . In addition, 85 MSE turnover events (38% of the total MSE departures) are followed by an outside appointment. This is higher compared with prior US studies that document a 19%-21% of outsiders (Parrino (1997) ; Clayton et al. (2000) ; Khurana and Nohria (2000) ; Huson et al. (2001) ). However, the higher frequency of outside selection is not surprising given that the current study focuses on the 1990s a period during which people have become more willing to change jobs or even industries. In contrast, previous US studies refer to earlier periods (i.e. from late 1960s to early 1990s) during which "going up the company's ladder" was a typical career path. Furthermore, it is reported that 43 of the outsiders (51% of total outside appointments) replace a dismissed Most Senior
Executive, a figure comparable to that found in the literature.
Panel C presents the frequency of Chairman dismissal under both types of MSE turnover, i.e. forced and non-forced. The data suggest that Chairman dismissal is more likely in the case of forced than non-forced MSE departure. Specifically, 31% of Chairmen are ousted when the MSE is forced whilst only 4.2% of Chairmen are removed when the MSE voluntarily departs.
[INSERT 
III. Specification Issues
Prior to the main analysis, it is important to address one important specification issue relevant to interpreting the study's findings. That is, the association between director dismissal/outside succession and firm performance. Table III presents Consequently, in order to get an unbiased estimate on the MSE turnover and outside succession variables, one should control for the effect of firm performance. Moreover, the challenge here is to define a measure of overall firm performance assumed to influence the likelihood of both Chairman and MSE dismissal as well as of outside succession. Panel B explores further the impact of SHR t-1 , which is the only common predictor of Chairman dismissal and MSE turnover and outside succession, by investigating whether different levels of SHR t-1 have a different effect. In particular, each firm is assigned to a decile based on the prior year shareholder returns over the entire period 1990-1998. Then, the implied probabilities of forced Chairman and MSE dismissal and outside succession are computed using the probit estimates from Panel A, Columns 1, 2 and 3 respectively. Finally, these probabilities are sorted into the performance deciles and averaged within each decile.
The common observation in Panel B is that the likelihood of both types of dismissal (i.e. Chairman and MSE) and outside succession is particularly high when prior year share performance is in the lowest decile. Specifically, it is found that for bad performers, representing returns of negative 68% to stockholders, the predicted Chairman dismissal rate is 5.9% as opposed to mediocre performers (i.e. mean SHR t-1 equals 0.087) and good performers (i.e. mean SHR t-1 equals 0.649) where the equivalent values of dismissal are 2% and 1.8%
respectively. Similarly, MSEs in firms of the worst performers are predicted to be about 6 times as likely to be forced out as top managers in firms of the best performers whilst the likelihood of an outside appointment in the lowest SHR t-1 decile is expected to be about 4 times as likely as in the highest SHR t-1 decile.
[ INSERT TABLE III] Taken together the findings in Panels A and B suggest that a number of metrics focusing on prior year stock returns, and especially the very low ones, may capture more effectively the impact of firm performance. Accordingly, the following section explores the consequences of MSE turnover for the Chairman's career where the impact of firm performance is controlled by the following three measures: a) prior year shareholder returns (SHR t-1 ), b) a dummy indicator equal to one (1) if the company is in the lowest decile of prior year stock returns (Lowest SHR t-1 Dummy) and zero (0) otherwise, and c) an interaction term between the above two metrics 12 .
IV. Results and Interpretations
This section contains the main findings of the study. In Section A, I explore the implications of forced and non-forced MSE departure for Chairman dismissal. Section B casts light on the interpretation of the results by presenting additional details of the turnover events. Finally, Section C focuses on forced MSE departure and examines its link with Chairman dismissal under alternative Chairman characteristics. In contrast, the likelihood of forced Chairman departure increases by 10.8 percentage points when the company's Most Senior Executive is ousted (p=0.000). As the unconditional Chairman dismissal rate is 2.2% (48/2180), the above effect corresponds to almost six times increase in the dismissal probability. These findings combined with the observation that the frequency of Chairman replacement is 31% and 4.2% under forced and non-forced MSE changes respectively (see Panel C, [ INSERT TABLE IV] In sum, the results in Table IV document that, in contrast with voluntary MSE departure, MSE dismissal has adverse consequences for the Chairman. That is, Chairmen of firms that oust the MSE experience an increased likelihood of removal. Moreover, Chairman replacement appears to take place in the same period as MSE removal and not at later stages.
A. Chairman Dismissal and MSE Turnover
13
The following section provides an interpretation of the findings by further analysing the dismissal of the top two directors.
B. Interpreting the Results: Restructuring or Ineffective Monitoring?
There are two main alternative explanations of a positive correlation between Chairman and MSE dismissal. The first one is the "restructuring" argument. In particular, several scholars
show that forced CEO resignations are associated with subsequent performance improvement (Kang and Shivdasani (1995) The second plausible explanation is the "ineffective monitoring" argument.
Specifically, Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that forced CEO removal indicates the effectiveness of internal control mechanisms (e.g. board of directors). However, an alternative argument is that CEO dismissal is symptomatic of ineffective monitoring. In the light of the above and given that the Chairman is primarily in charge of CEO monitoring, an ousted under-performing MSE -reflected in poor returns to shareholders -may signal to the market that the Chairman was not successfully "inspecting" the latter's performance. Panel A shows that the majority (9 in absolute value, 60%) of the Chairman and MSE removals are announced on the same date. In contrast, in only 27% of the cases the MSE is replaced prior to the Chairman whilst in 20% of the cases the process is reversed. Panel B describes further the 9 simultaneous Chairman and MSE dismissals. As reported, in 5 out of 9 of these turnover events (56%) the Chairman and the MSE are not only ousted from the board but also from the firm. In the remaining 4 cases, the two top directors either continue with the firm as part-time consultants or stay on the board for no longer than one year. Moreover, 6 out of 9 firms (67%) experience additional director departures in the year of Chairman and MSE dismissal 14 . According to Panel C, the number of departing directors ranges from 1 to 4 whilst the majority of them (85%) are executives.
In sum, the results are broadly consistent with the restructuring interpretation. That is, firms tend to dismiss the Chairman, along with the MSE, to facilitate the reshuffle of the board, i.e. the appointment of a new CEO and other directors, primarily executive, with a different human capital. This in turn will enable changes in future corporate decisions, such as the reversals of past errors or the establishment of new policies.
C. Chairman and MSE Dismissal Relative to Chairman Characteristics
In the previous analysis I assumed that the relation between Chairman and MSE dismissal is constant across Chairmen. However, the extent to which the Chairman experiences adverse consequences when the MSE is forced out may vary depending on: a) whether the former is involved in the selection of the latter, b) the Chairman's background and c) the type of chairmanship.
In particular, a Chairman that chooses an MSE who fails to deliver -as this is reflected in poor returns to shareholders -may be more likely to be penalized. Similarly, a Chairman who was the company's previous MSE and hence is responsible for past corporate decisions may also be more likely to be punished by the investors. Finally, in the UK company law there is no distinction between the responsibilities of executive and non-executive directors (DTI (2000)). Additionally, the Cadbury report (1992) and the final report on corporate governance (1998) strongly support the unitary board system, i.e. emphasise that all directors are equally responsible for developing and implementing the company's strategy as well as for governing the company. This, however, does not preclude firms allocating specific duties to their directors. Consequently, to the extent that executive Chairmen can be considered part of the top management team, one would expect to observe a higher correlation between
Chairman and MSE forced removal than in the case of non-executive Chairmen whose role could be more clearly defined as that of a monitor. The incidence and rate of Chairman dismissal, at the time of forced MSE departure, increases significantly from the "MSE selection not involved" to the "MSE selection involved" sample; dismissal rates are 6.7% and 27.3% respectively whilst the p-value for their difference is 0.005. Furthermore, the rate of forced departure is higher for those Chairmen who were the firm's previous MSE compared to those who were not (23.1% compared to 10.4%) as well as for executive than non-executive Chairmen (20.6% as opposed to 11.8%).
However, in both cases the difference in the rates is not statistically significant according to conventional standards (p-values are 0.200 and 0.239 respectively). 
V. Sensitivity and Robustness Analysis
This section discusses a number of tests conducted to examine the robustness of the findings.
First, given that firm performance is a very important determinant of Chairman dismissal, I
examine whether the stock profitability measures employed in the study are the appropriate proxies. In particular, I repeat the analysis in Panel A, Table III Moreover, I re-run the models in Table IV 
VI. Conclusion
Most British companies separate the roles of CEO and Chairman. The former runs the company, the latter runs the board and the two directors interact to a great extent. 1. All and forced executive departures as a % of total executive Chairmen (698). 
Table II Summary Statistics of Selected Variables
Descriptive statistics of firm-specific and director-specific variables for a sample of the largest (by market capitalisation) 460 UK firms during the 1990-1998 period. Company shareholder return (SHR) is calculated as the log of (RI t+1 /RI t ), where RI stands for Return Index on 1 st January. A company's return index shows the growth in the share value and the value of the dividends. The relevant formula is: RI = RI t * (P t + D t )/P t-1 , where P t = price on ex-date (i.e. the day dividend payments become certain), P t-1 = price on previous day and D t = dividend payment associated with ex-date t. Market value (MV) is reported in £m. Size is the log of the market value. Chairman (MSE) tenure is the number of years in the position of Chairman (MSE). The MSE in each company for each year is taken to be the CEO if such a role exists. When no CEO exists the MSE is taken to be either the executive Chairman or the group MD. Marginal effects of probit regressions and implied probabilities of top director dismissal and outside MSE succession for a sample of the largest (by market capitalisation) 460 UK firms during the 1990-1998 period. A Chairman/MSE is defined as departing in year t if he is not disclosed in the firm's top director team in year t+1. Departures are classified as forced when no reason is reported or when the relevant FT article mentions poor performance, policy/personality disagreement, scandal, pressure from the board of directors, institutional investors and/or the City. The MSE in each company for each year is taken to be the CEO if such a role exists. When no CEO exists the MSE is taken to be either the executive Chairman or the group MD. MSE succession are classified as outside if the new MSE has been with the firm for a year or less at the time of the succession announcement. Company shareholder return (SHR) is calculated as the log of (RI t+1 /RI t ), where RI stands for Return Index on 1 st January. A company's return index shows the growth in the share value and the value of the dividends. The relevant formula is: RI = RI t * (P t + D t )/P t-1 , where P t = price on ex-date (i.e. the day dividend payments become certain), P t-1 = price on previous day and D t = dividend payment associated with exdate t. Accounting returns (EBIT) are earnings before interest and taxes standardised by the book value of total assets. Chairman age in Column 1. Departing MSE age in Columns 2 and 3. The marginal effect of variable X 1 for the probit model is calculated as:
where φ ( )
. is the standard normal density, x denotes the mean values of the explanatory variables and 1 β is the coefficient estimate of X 1 . All probit models include time-and industry-specific dummy variables; p-values in parentheses. Deciles 1 and 10 stand for the worst and best performers respectively. Implied probabilities of Chairman dismissal, MSE dismissal and outside MSE succession are computed using probit estimates from Panel A -Columns 1, 2 and 3 respectively. (0) otherwise. Company shareholder return (SHR) is calculated as the log of (RI t+1 /RI t ), where RI stands for Return Index on 1 st January. A company's return index shows the growth in the share value and the value of the dividends. The relevant formula is: RI = RI t * (P t + D t )/P t-1 , where P t = price on ex-date (i.e. the day dividend payments become certain), P t-1 = price on previous day and D t = dividend payment associated with ex-date t. Lowest SHR t-1 Dummy equals one (1) if SHR t-1 is in the lowest decile and zero (0) otherwise. The marginal effect of variable X 1 for the probit model is calculated as:
is the standard normal density, x denotes the mean values of the explanatory variables and 1 β is the coefficient estimate of X 1 . All probit models include time-and industry-specific dummy variables; pvalues in parentheses. (0) otherwise. Company shareholder return (SHR) is calculated as the log of (RI t+1 /RI t ), where RI stands for Return Index on 1 st January. A company's return index shows the growth in the share value and the value of the dividends. The relevant formula is: RI = RI t * (P t + D t )/P t-1 , where P t = price on ex-date (i.e. the day dividend payments become certain), P t-1 = price on previous day and D t = dividend payment associated with ex-date t. Lowest SHR t-1 Dummy equals one (1) if SHR t-1 is in the lowest decile and zero (0) otherwise. Model 1 divides the sample into those Chairmen who are involved in the selection of the dismissed MSE and those who are not. If the Chairman has been in office for a longer period than the incumbent MSE, then the former is regarded to have participated in the nomination of the latter. Model 2 divides the sample into those Chairmen who were the company's previous MSE and those who were not. Model 3 divides the sample into executive and non-executive Chairmen. The marginal effect of variable X 1 for the probit model is calculated as:
, where φ ( ) . is the standard normal density, x denotes the mean values of the explanatory variables and 1 β is the coefficient estimate of X 1 . All probit models include time-and industry-specific dummy variables; p-values in parentheses. the day dividend payments become certain), P t-1 = price on previous day and D t = dividend payment associated with ex-date t. 8 In Section III I examine the relation between Chairman dismissal/MSE succession and firm performance. In addition to stock returns I also use accounting earnings. However, as will be explained, focusing on a number of stock profitability measures controls better for the performance effect.
9 A more direct way to test the above is to identify whether sample firms have a nominating committee and whether this committee includes the Chairman. Ideally, one should have information regarding the Chairman's vote. Unfortunately, data are not available on the above.
Nevertheless, as already mentioned, the majority of UK companies have a nominating committee, which is headed by the board chair (PIRC (1999)).
10 There are two MSE departures for which no information is found. I exclude these observations from the construction of the forced and non-forced samples.
11 The only exception is the second lag of stock returns, which, however, appears negative and significant at the 10% level only under forced Chairman departures. 12 The endogeneity issue suggests a simultaneous estimation is required. However, such an estimation is complicated by the fact that the dependent variables in all the equations of the system are dichotomous. In fact, under these circumstances one cannot fully recover the equation parameters (Maddala (1983) , p.244). Consequently, the use of the above share performance metrics is expected to reduce, but not eliminate, the measurement error of the MSE turnover variables. Similarly, one cannot draw causal inferences from this analysis;
instead, any link between Chairman dismissal and MSE turnover should be interpreted as a mere association.
13 A third explanation is that a Chairman who replaces the incumbent CEO may experience an increased likelihood of dismissal as the new CEO may seek to replace those directors that are likely to pose a threat to him (e.g. challenge his decisions). However, given that the Chairman plays an important part in the selection of the incoming CEO, it is unlikely that the former will appoint someone who will subsequently remove him from the board.
14 Similar to top director departures, I identify other director departures by comparing the composition of the board across years. Main source used is the Corporate Register.
Unfortunately, detailed information regarding the departure of other directors (e.g. Table   VII is that they allow a direct comparison of the estimates of the MSE Forced t variable between the relevant sub-samples. 16 Similar to previous studies (Jensen and Murphy (1990) ; Huson et al. (2001) ) I compute market-adjusted stock returns as the company's stock return minus a value weighted return on the common stock of all London Stock Exchange firms. I define industry-adjusted stock return and accounting earnings as the company's stock return and accounting earnings, respectively, minus the median value of the corresponding measure for all firms in the primary one-digit SIC industry in which the firm is active at the time of the turnover.
